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Informal Local Governance Institutions: What They Do and Why They 
Matter 
 
Shandana Khan Mohmand 
 
 
Summary 
 
There is growing scholarly and policy awareness of the fact that public authority is rarely 
exercised only by the state. In fact, a host of actors and institutions – some visible and 
recognised, others invisible and less obvious – exercise authority over and regulate the 
everyday life of local populations across large parts of the world, with important implications 
for public policy. While we recognise more and more that such actors and institutions take on 
various governance-related functions within local communities, our understanding of the role 
that they play is fairly limited and, possibly because of this, our discomfort with them is often 
fairly high. This paper represents an effort to deal with this gap. It is led by a central puzzle – 
as the incidence of electoral democracy has increased across the world, we would expect to 
see an accompanying formalisation of governance through the consolidation of public 
authority within institutions of the state. This has not happened. Instead, we find that the role 
and importance of informal local institutions that take on governance functions has increased 
and that they are a central component of ‘multicentric’ governance in large parts of the world. 
Why is this so and how do these informal institutions sustain and perpetuate the local public 
authority that they exercise across multiple domains? I provide a number of explanations for 
the persistence of such institutions in large parts of South Asia, Africa and the Western 
Balkans. Our interest in these informal local institutions is practical and policy-oriented, and I 
use empirical evidence from a decade of primary research in South Asia and the Western 
Balkans to draw a boundary around a set of institutions that we call informal local 
governance institutions (ILGIs).  
 
Keywords: informal institutions, local governance, public authority, service delivery, South 
Asia, Western Balkans 
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1 Introduction 
 
How to increase effective, accountable public authority in poor countries of the global South 
is a central research question within governance studies today (Centre for the Future State 
2010). Some scholars have attempted to answer this question by pointing to the ‘complex 
interdependence’ of formal and informal governance institutions that leads to ‘multi-centric 
governance’ (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2003). They point out that 
patterns and sources of authority are complex and varied, and our understanding of public 
authority risks being incomplete if we hold on to narrow conceptualisations of politics and 
governance based only on formal state institutions. 
 
Despite this, most governance and political science research appears to have real difficulty 
acknowledging the diverse kinds of authoritative local institutions, largely legitimised by some 
variant of traditionality, that exist across different parts of the world. Because such local 
informal institutions were largely wiped out by states in Europe and were largely absent in 
subsequent theories of the state and its engagement with its citizens, we now find it hard to 
both identify and accept them. Public policy literature in particular continues to have little real 
sense of exactly how local informal institutions work, and how they impact policy processes. 
This paper represents an effort to deal with this gap by bringing together literature on such 
institutions with about a decade of primary research on local informal institutions in South 
Asia and the Western Balkans. 
 
Our ideas about states and governance are deeply influenced by the history of the creation 
of states in Europe. States became the dominant political institutions by destroying or 
severely restricting the authority of alternative, lower-level political institutions. As states 
evolved, the ideal of a direct relationship between states and individual citizens dominated 
over the fact that individuals very often engaged with the state indirectly.  
 
Our general view of statecitizen relations continues to assume a direct relationship 
between state officials, offices or institutions on the one hand, and individual citizens  
in the form of voters, petitioners, recipients of state services, applicants, complainants 
and defendants  on the other hand.  
(Mohmand and Misic Mihajlovic 2014: 2) 
 
This ideal of an individual relationship between the state and each citizen fits well with the 
concept of equal citizenship, but it sits very uneasily with the social and economic inequality 
that exists in most democracies around the world. This reflects in part the simple fact that 
citizens are not equal in practice  some have better access to the state than others, and 
some get more from the state than others. This differential status gives rise to alternate 
brokered, informal and fairly institutionalised strategies for accessing the state.    
 
When these strategies are well anchored in communities, and create or reinforce institutions 
that exercise local public authority but also use this authority to engage actively with formal 
governance processes, and when they take on state-like roles and deliver services within the 
community, we can refer to them as informal local governance institutions (ILGIs). The term 
signifies that the particular informal institution we are dealing with here works in communities 
within a defined territorial area and takes on governance functions that we would otherwise 
expect the formal state to deal with. These ILGIs lack formal state sanction but they often 
have a fairly institutionalised way of doing business  in selecting their leaders, recruiting and 
representing members, mediating relationships between members and, most importantly, in 
working with the state.  
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1.1 A practical puzzle and some conclusions 
 
My interest in ILGIs is practical and policy-oriented. It stems from observations about the 
extent to which they actually govern localities through the various functions discussed in this 
paper. The conceptual distinctions are driven by empiricism, and are intended to draw a 
boundary around a set of institutions that appear to perform a relatively common range of 
functions and relate to formal institutions in a similar range of ways. Our empirical evidence 
from South Asia and the Western Balkans indicates that ILGIs have three defining 
characteristics: (1) they are state-like to the extent that they enjoy general local territorial 
authority, but they lack the revenue-raising prerogatives of states; (2) intermediation between 
‘their’ populations and the external world constitutes a significant part of their activities; and 
(3) they stand in ambiguous, variable and contested relationships to the formal state 
apparatus.  
 
The paper is organised around a discussion of these three defining features, but it is also led 
by a central puzzle. As the incidence of electoral democracy has increased across the world, 
we would expect to see an accompanying formalisation of governance through the 
consolidation of public authority within institutions of the state (O’Donnell 1996; Przeworski 
1991). This has not happened. Instead, we find that the role and importance of informal local 
institutions that take on governance functions, i.e. ILGIs, has increased and that they are a 
central component of ‘multicentric’ governance in large parts of South Asia, Africa and even 
the Western Balkans. Why is this so and how do ILGIs sustain and perpetuate the local 
public authority that they exercise across multiple domains? I provide a number of 
explanations for their persistence in the various sections of this paper.   
 
My arguments in this paper provide three conclusions relevant to public policy that stand in 
some tension with one another. The first is that, given a concern to improve the quality of 
governance in less formalised democracies, the roles of ILGIs cannot be ignored or wished 
away. ILGIs have considerable influence over how large parts of the population participate in 
governance processes, interact with local governments and donor projects, how and what 
information they access, and how they vote in elections. The second is that these roles are 
highly variable. ILGIs do many different kinds of things and both (a) provide valued collective 
goods and services in ways that could reasonably be encouraged, and (b) constitute vehicles 
for the expression of the kinds of local socioeconomic and sociopolitical dominance that 
undermine the principles of democracy and secularism embedded in most constitutions.  
 
The third point is that ILGIs are inherently problematic targets for public policy intervention. 
They are diverse, poorly understood, barely mapped and strongly rooted in local history and 
local socioeconomic structures. This makes our current task of conceptualising and defining 
ILGIs both more difficult and more important because policy interventions to either support or 
constrain such local institutions are necessarily linked to a better understanding of the 
conceptual distinctions that exist across them. Our research indicates that ILGIs cover a 
spectrum of organisational structures, ranging from the highly personalistic, where authority 
is vested in individuals, to more collective and collegiate institutions where authority is shared 
among more or less equal colleagues. Different types of ILGIs require different policy 
responses. Institutions that are personalistic may require reforms that weaken their powers 
and their ability to negatively impact the lives of the populations over whom they exercise 
authority. More collegiate institutions, on the other hand, may be more readily integrated into 
public policy processes without the risk of undermining local democracy.  
 
1.2 Plan 
 
The current paper advances the agenda of conceptualising and defining ILGIs by bringing 
together literature with empirical evidence from the field to draw a conceptual boundary 
around a set of institutions that we call ILGIs. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 
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provides conceptual definition to the term ILGIs. The next three sections  Sections 3, 4 and 
5  discuss the three main defining characteristics of ILGIs listed above by combining 
literature on informal local institutions in different parts of the world with primary evidence 
collected in India and Pakistan in South Asia, and in Macedonia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the Western Balkans. In each of these sections, I consider the primary 
debates and perspectives that inform our current view of ILGIs and their persistence in 
current governance systems. Section 6 concludes by underscoring the need for further 
research in order to understand the variation across ILGIs so that we may eventually take on 
the larger task of drawing up a full typology of such institutions.  
 
 
2 Conceptualising informal local governance 
institutions (ILGIs) 
 
Deciding what to call a particular type of local institution is not just a matter of evocative 
nomenclature, but also one of defining an approach, and of facilitating meaningful analysis, 
disaggregation and categorisation. Two terms in particular – informal and institutions – define 
our approach to the study of ILGIs, and both can have different meanings and are subject to 
considerable debate in social science. At this point, I need to discuss only four issues before 
going on to deal with the literature and our empirical material. 
 
 I adhere to the definition of informal institutions advanced by Helmke and Levitsky (2006: 
5): ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and 
enforced outside officially sanctioned channels’. They add a number of points of 
explanation that are helpful: (a) their definition implies shared expectations about 
behaviour, not necessarily shared values;1 and (b) informal institutions should be 
confused neither with weak formal institutions nor with informal behavioural regularities.2 
O’Donnell (1996: 40) similarly argues that informal rules of the political game that 
become institutionalised when they are ‘widely shared and deeply rooted’ are not to be 
confused with symptoms of the state’s dysfunctionality.  
 
 What is informality? There are in social science two different general understandings of 
the notion of a formalityinformality continuum. The first is a distinction between spheres 
of activity that are formal to the extent that they are legal, official, transparent or openly 
sanctioned by legitimate authorities (e.g. a national constitution) and informal to the 
extent that they are extra-legal, illegal, unofficial, non-transparent or unsanctioned by 
those authorities (e.g. the 'horse-trading' about allocation of positions of power that 
typically precedes the formation of a coalition government). The second is a distinction 
between activities like (a) the proceedings of law courts, which are formal in that they are 
patterned, predictable and ritualised and (b) lynch-mobs and 'kangaroo courts' that 
deliver their versions of justice in relatively spontaneous, unpatterned and unpredictable 
ways. I am concerned here with informality of the first type: with the fact, summarised by 
Corbridge et al. (2005), that in rural South Asia a great deal of local governance is 
conducted through agents, social networks and procedures that do not feature in the 
formal texts and sometimes seem to violate wholesale the law, norms of good 
administrative practice, and the principles of representative democracy.  
 
                                                          
1  This element in the definition helps to put clear blue water between our approach and the assumption or implication that 
rural institutions perceived as 'traditional' must be rooted in (traditional) values (Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 78). 
2  Informal behavioural regularities do not constitute institutions unless rule-bound or rooted in shared expectations about 
the behaviour of others, so that their violation will invite external sanction. 
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 These informal governance practices are sometimes highly formal in the second sense of 
the term. Ananth Pur (2004) points out that in some villages in the Indian state of 
Karnataka, informal local councils have quite precise timetables and rules for registering 
and then dealing with dispute cases. While they are in session, they command the kinds 
of respectful behaviour, demeanour and speech expected in formal courts. Ananth Pur 
and Moore (2010) provide an example from a village in Karnataka where the council 
meets every Monday morning to resolve disputes, and in each of the 30 villages where 
they conducted research, the informal local councils formally present their income and 
expenditure accounts to their constituents on the day after the Hindu New Year. A similar 
degree of institutionalisation of ILGIs is found in the northeast Indian state of Manipur. 
Every village populated by the dominant Meitei community contains an ILGI that belongs 
to a generic category of Leikei clubs. Most Leikei operate as ‘sports’ or ‘youth’ clubs – 
they possess permanent offices and sports grounds, and are run by a voluntary, elected 
committee with role titles (Chair, Secretary etc.) – but they also exercise recognised local 
general territorial jurisdiction, intermediate with formal public institutions over a wide 
range of issues, mediate local disputes, and sometimes exercise coercive force, to the 
extent for example of driving away wrongdoers and burning their houses.3   
 
 Following North (1990) and many other institutional theorists, Helmke and Levitsky 
(2006) insist on a clear distinction between institutions (the rules of the game) and 
organisations (the players). While we do distinguish individual actors like brokers and 
mediators from ILGIs  an individual broker is not the same as the informal institution of 
brokerage  we face practical difficulties in fully adhering to this distinction between 
institutions and organisations. The informal local governance phenomena with which we 
deal sometimes manifest themselves as distinct informal organisations, like 'traditional 
village councils', and at other times more as informal, socially shared rules embedded in 
expectations (i.e. informal institutions) that greatly influence behaviour in and around 
formal governance organisations. An example of the latter would be the practices that 
enable a large landlord to leverage a minor official position in the formal administrative 
hierarchy into wide ranging informal authority within his locality. However, the local 
networks that this landlord employs to maintain and exploit his informal authority might 
also look rather like (informal) organisations. The attempt to rigorously distinguish 
institutions from organisations becomes, in this case at least, an obstacle to useful 
understanding of the world. I use the word institutions as our generic term, and speak of 
organisations only when the term seems appropriate, i.e. when dealing with routinised 
patterns of social interaction characterised by the pursuit of collective goals, internal 
performance controls, and relatively clear external boundaries. Our empirical material will 
hopefully validate this pragmatism. 
 
 
3 The public authority of 'mini-states' 
 
ILGIs function like mini-states in that they exercise a degree of general territorial authority, 
but they lack a key material attribute of stateness: de facto or de jure authority to draw 
significant regular revenues from the populations over which they exercise authority. Unlike, 
for example, local funeral societies, temple committees or savings and credit associations, 
they do not confine themselves to a specific or narrow set of functions. Many operate in 
multiple domains, take on a wide range of activities, and are understood locally to have a 
right or duty to act in ways analogous to national states. They are expected to be generally 
responsible for dealing with a wide range of problems or opportunities, and to exercise 
                                                          
3  We are grateful to Irina Ningthoujam, a doctoral student at the Jamia Islamia University, New Delhi, for information on 
contemporary Leikei clubs. They are often represented as ‘traditional’, but seem to have their origins mainly in the 
1940s. 
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authority over entire locally resident populations – who, like the citizens of states, may have 
little choice about compliance while they remain within that jurisdiction. ILGIs might dispense 
justice, help with the connections needed to obtain urban employment, resolve disputes, 
organise religious and sporting events, raise matching revenues for external grants, punish 
violations of social norms, oversee local development projects or manage the ways in which 
villagers vote in formal elections. However, they have no significant claim on locally raised 
formal revenues, and no employed staff, at least not until these functions are formally 
granted to them by law, such as in the case of the Bosnian ILGIs, mesni zajednicas, that are 
considered a part of sub-municipal local government in one half of the country. To the extent 
that ILGIs have financial resources, these are normally raised locally in ad hoc fashions for 
specific purposes, or obtained by tapping into the expenditure streams of the formal state. 
They depend mainly on a diversity of less tangible organisational and ideological resources: 
voluntary participation; claims to compliance articulated in terms of traditionality and 
collective local interests; congruence with the interests of local elites; and, in the last resort, 
physical coercion. In some cases, though, such as in Niger, local chiefs may charge for 
certain services, such as the granting of property certificates to local farmers (Lund 2006b: 
696). In fact, citizens in parts of Burkina Faso, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe believe that it is traditional chiefs and not the government 
that can allocate land for use (Baldwin 2014: 254).  
 
Lund (2006b) uses the term ‘twilight institutions’ to refer to local institutions that lie outside 
the state but are part of the ‘idea of stateness’ because they exercise public authority over a 
delimited geographic area. So local chiefs, lineage leaders, vigilantes, religious fraternities, 
political factions and activists, hometown associations, and neighbourhood groups occupy a 
twilight zone in which this exercise of ‘stateness’ by non-state actors and institutions blurs the 
boundary between the formal and informal (Lund 2006a: 673; Lund 2006b: 689695). Such 
ILGIs often have territorial markers, like flags, signs, or even graffiti on walls to symbolically 
mark and demarcate the area over which they exercise authority. Raeymaekers, Menkhaus 
and Vlassenroot (2008) use the term ‘non-state governance’ to describe a similar 
configuration of local institutions in Africa that exercise public authority alongside the state to 
determine the ways in which societies organise power in order to manage public resources. 
 
3.1 Sources of public authority 
 
Why are ILGIs able to operate across multiple domains and exercise general territorial 
authority within communities? I offer two explanations for this. The first is based on their 
embeddedness within local traditions and cultural practice, while the second points to the 
legacy of colonial rule in Africa and South Asia. The two explanations stand in some tension 
to one another  the former deals with inherent authority while the latter claims constructed 
authority  but it is not hard to imagine that the two sources have reinforced one another over 
the decades.   
 
There is widespread support in the literature for the fact that ILGIs draw on a strong sense of 
shared culture and history with their ‘constituents’ for legitimacy and authority, and on their 
understanding of the local context and its prevailing norms and shared expectations (Logan 
2009, 2013; Okereafoezeke 2003). Such familiarity and closeness leads to greater trust in 
these local institutions. For example, Baldwin (2007: 78) finds that ‘52% of Zambians trust 
traditional leaders a lot or a great deal; in contrast, only 32% of Zambians have this degree of 
trust in the ruling party and only 18% have this amount of trust in opposition parties’. 
Furthermore, trust is ensured by the fact that local communities can impose social censure 
on ILGIs in case they deviate from shared norms and expectations. This is a more direct and 
often more effective form of accountability than that which exists between citizens and formal 
actors and institutions in countries like Nigeria, and can, as a result, make citizens feel more 
empowered (Okereafoezeke 2003). As Scheye (2009: 10) points out, ‘a trusted and 
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legitimate non-state/local justice and security network is, by definition, a locally owned justice 
and security provider as the repository of the users’ beliefs, norms, and values’.  
 
The second explanation looks at the legacies of various elements of indirect rule by external 
actors. In most of South Asia and Africa, colonial rule was lengthy and pervasive, and played 
a major role in shaping contemporary formal political institutions. It also shaped ILGIs. The 
impact was complex and variable across space, and therefore difficult to generalise to other 
contexts. A common feature, and one that may travel more easily, was that the bureaucratic 
institutions of the formal state reached down deeply into most of rural society, leaving 
relatively small and local domains for informal governance institutions. Two features of 
colonial administration were especially important, at least in South Asia.  
 
First, the material basis of colonial rule was a surprisingly intrusive and efficient land revenue 
system, which managed to extract up to a third of the gross value of agricultural production 
for the state (Ananth Pur and Moore 2010; Mohmand 2011). Villages  
 
typically possessed a ‘headman’ who was recognisably a state official; a set of land 
records, with sketch maps, that in principle documented the potential productivity and 
tax liabilities of each parcel of land and identified the person responsible for paying the 
tax; and an official responsible for maintaining those records. For a society so very 
poor and agrarian, the extent of the penetration of localities by the formal state 
apparatus was remarkable.  
(Ananth Pur and Moore 2010: 606) 
 
Second, this apparently highly intrusive and capable state nevertheless operated to a high 
degree through variants of the systems of indirect rule that characterised most empires and 
colonial polities. Indirect rule is summarised by Tilly (2007: 19) as, ‘systems in which the 
central power received tribute, cooperation, and guarantees of compliance on behalf of the 
subject populations from regional power holders who enjoyed great autonomy within their 
own domains’.4 Indirect rule is a relative term. As we have seen, in relation to land revenue 
and land records in particular, colonial rule in South Asia was rather direct. The indirectness 
stems from two sources. First, from the fact that, outside its core concerns about basic public 
order, land revenue and the supply of loyal recruits to the armed forces, the British colonial 
state in South Asia was not strongly motivated to intervene in or regulate rural society, 
economy or culture.5 In rural areas in particular, issues of religion, education, customs, 
marriage, sanitation, road transport and employment were rarely taken up with any vigour or 
consistency by the formal state. Deep direct interventions, like extensive irrigation 
development and population resettlement in what is now the Pakistani Punjab, undertaken in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were exceptional.  
 
Second and more important, colonial rule was based on an extensive system of delegation to 
a wide array of ‘devolved authorities’ of responsibility for land revenue, and sometimes also 
public administration generally. Devolved authority took many different forms and created 
powerful groups of intermediaries between village residents and the colonial state. Our 
evidence shows that local variations in the nature and type of these partly underlie 
contemporary variations among ILGIs in South Asia. The same pattern of rule was visible 
across Africa too where the colonial state gave local traditional authorities ‘power to raise 
                                                          
4  The opposite, direct rule, implies ‘structures extending governmental communication and control continuously from 
central institutions to individual localities or even households, and back again’ (Tilly 2007: 19). Pure direct rule implies a 
totalistic relationship between individual households and bureaucratic agencies under the direct control of the central 
state. 
5  Our argument here is about modes of intervention and rule, not about consequences. Even indirect and relatively non-
interventionist rule could have great consequences. For example, it is now widely recognised that the colonial insistence 
on registering the population according to membership of a small number of clearly defined, hierarchically ordered caste 
categories eventually had a major impact on how caste was perceived and practised. 
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taxes, preside over courts, and allocate land’ (Baldwin 2014: 254). In many parts, this power 
remained intact even after post-independence attempts by governments to reduce the 
influence of chiefs and traditional authorities, and made them important intermediaries 
between citizens and the post-colonial state.  
 
We have then a first level of explanation of why ILGIs so often operate in multiple domains 
and exercise general territorial authority, especially in rural areas and within more 
marginalised and remote populations.  
 
 
4 Intermediating between citizens and states 
 
ILGIs play major intermediary roles between local populations and the wider world. They may 
resolve local disputes, monitor local schools or organise local festivals and cultural activities. 
But they also determine whether and how a village population can access a government 
programme for improving sanitation, which village streets then get drained and paved, 
whether and how a local case of assault is presented to the police, who actually stands for 
election to the formal local council, and how villagers’ votes are cast in national elections. As 
the incidence of electoral democracy has increased across the world, accompanied by a 
growing variety of development programmes intended to channel public resources down to 
the local level (Krishna 2003), these intermediation functions have only become more, rather 
than less, important. Why is this so? I provide three explanations here: (a) they persist 
precisely because of electoral democracy as political intermediaries; (b) they substitute for 
weak central states by providing public services and locally rooted territorial governance; and 
(c) they extend the writ and authority of post-colonial states in much the same way as they 
did that of the colonial state.  
 
4.1 Political intermediation 
 
Political science literature has taken up the related question of the persistence of clientelism 
in many democracies, both young and old, and has argued that in some of these systems 
democratisation has simply led to the institutionalisation of the many informal ways in which 
citizens engage with the state (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; O’Donnell 1996; Stokes et al. 
2013). At the most fundamental level, this literature points to the fact that within today’s 
democracies citizens often connect with the state through informal, mediating actors and 
institutions. Sometimes this is through intermediaries who have better access to the state 
because of their social status, such as traditional chiefs (Baldwin 2007), or who specialise in 
cultivating better access as a political strategy, such as brokers (Stokes et al. 2013) and 
political fixers (Krishna 2007; Manor 2000). In other cases, citizens access services through 
local informal institutions that either provide what the state does not – such as the local 
provision of justice and non-state policing (Baker 2005) – or that can increase the collective 
ability of groups to negotiate better access, such as kinship groups (Cheema, Mohmand and 
Naqvi 2007).  
 
The extent and character of these intermediary roles interact with the broad political 
characteristics of ILGIs and their often Janus-faced nature. Like virtually all political 
organisations, ILGIs simultaneously perform two different types of roles: the exercise of 
domination, through which some people advantage themselves relative to others; and the 
provision of collective goods and services that benefit a broader constituency (Moe 2005). 
For example, Mandelbaum (1970) suggests that when ‘traditional panchayats’, or informal 
village councils, in India were dealing with intra-village issues, they were generally operating 
in regulatory mode, often enforcing the hierarchical norms about interactions among 
members of different castes that are especially characteristic of Indian society. In that mode, 
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informal village councils would tend to reveal their more repressive faces, and to focus more 
on enforcing unequal distributions of resources and status among caste groups in the village. 
However, when representing the village collectively in relation to the outside world, they 
tended to transcend these regulatory and distributional orientations to act in a more cohesive 
manner, and to provide local public goods. This distinction between the internal and external 
orientations of ILGIs is one basis on which one can formulate plausible hypotheses about 
their functioning and consequences.  
 
Another distinction relates to the separation between the national and local roles that ILGIs 
take on. Chiefs and traditional authorities continue to appear as part of national governance 
processes across many parts of the African continent, but Logan (2009: 106) argues that 
they may play only a limited part, restricted to ceremonies and ‘advisory roles’ at that level, 
leading us to wonder why they persist in electoral democracies. It is their role at the local 
level that demonstrates the extent of their very real authority and the impact that they have 
on governance. Here ‘they may compete with local government officials for real power – over 
land, tax revenues or other resources, responsibility for dispensing justice, and influence 
over community activities and decisions, and even votes’.  
 
Baldwin (2007 and 2014) uses the reality of deep ethnic divisions across Africa to show why 
some ILGIs’ functions have only been strengthened with electoral democracy. Politicians 
solicit the support of local intermediaries, such as hereditary chiefs in Zambia, to mobilise 
votes and they especially empower chiefs of ‘unaligned ethnic groups’ in order to build 
electoral support for their parties when appeals to ethnicity are feasible. A chief would need 
to be both politically unaligned and in command of a significant number of votes to receive 
such political patronage. This is somewhat similar to the earlier argument made by Posner 
(2004) to explain the nature of politics in Zambia and Malawi, and the ways in which local 
ethnic identities are manipulated for electoral gain by political parties. Baldwin (2014) 
explains that, in fact, the least devolution of power to chiefs has occurred either in countries 
where one ethnic group has been in power and coalition-building on ethnic lines is 
unnecessary, such as Namibia, or in countries that have few hierarchically structured but 
politically non-aligned ethnic groups, such as Kenya, Liberia, Tanzania. This logic is 
replicated in the organisation of politics in India and Pakistan, where political parties are 
constructed around aggregations of caste and kinship networks that are mobilised through a 
variety of local informal political intermediaries (Chandra 2007; Mohmand 2014). 
 
4.2 Public service provision 
 
Two other explanations for the persistence of ILGIs in democratising systems are rooted in a 
continuing debate  do ILGIs substitute for the state or do they help strengthen the state’s 
authority by extending its writ? The literature related to the first of these two explanations 
talks about ILGIs as substitutes for the state in the provision of different kinds of public 
services, most importantly security and justice but also health and education, within a 
geographically delimited area within which they exercise authority. They may have no formal 
sanction for this role but they are ‘accepted and authorized in practice’ (Scheye 2009: 25). 
 
Much of this explanation is based on the idea of the limitations of the formal state across 
large parts of Africa and Asia, and that ILGIs step in where formal institutions are incomplete. 
Formal institutions establish general parameters about behaviour, but cannot cover all 
contingencies (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). That is especially likely to be the case among 
small rural populations that obtain most of their livelihoods from local resources and are 
remote from the seats of formal government authority. Standardised bureaucratic responses 
are unlikely to work well when the needs of populations are locally specific and highly 
variable. ‘Resources need to be mobilised, allocated or managed; disputes resolved; 
threatening intrusions repelled; external authorities dealt with; and ceremonies and collective 
celebrations organized’ (Ananth Pur and Moore 2010: 605). Local needs and interests tend 
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to be especially context-specific ‘where residence and livelihood overlap – in agrarian 
villages, in pastoral and mining settlements, in fishing communities, or in urban 
neighbourhoods specialising in particular lines of commerce or production’ (Ananth Pur and 
Moore 2007: 8). Here fishing practices need to be agreed and maintained, irrigations 
systems regulated, common lands and forests to manage and police, property disputes to 
settle, and scarce resources like sand, gravel, clay, and water for drinking, washing and 
watering animals to be allocated (Ananth Pur and Moore 2010: 605). Informal local 
institutional responses to these needs are all the more likely where, as in South Asia, 
governments raise relatively little in taxation, and the official state agencies have limited 
capacity to work intensively at very local levels in rural areas.  
 
ILGIs step into these spaces and provide local services. Mesni zajednicas in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Macedonia, and their close variants across the Western Balkans, work as 
the principal form of ‘neighbourhood governance’. They gather citizens around spatial 
interests, involve them in local government decisions, and deal with a variety of services, 
including managing street lighting, local roads, and other communal infrastructure. In many 
cases they also set up, manage and coordinate local water services, and monitor health and 
education services (Mohmand and Misic Mihajlovic 2014). This is a recurring pattern across 
many other countries. In Burundi, traditional institutions called bashingantahe play 
‘multidimensional roles’ spanning the judicial, social and political spheres, and play an 
important role in maintaining peace and cohesion within communities (Dexter and 
Ntahombye 2005). Similarly, local networks led by ‘Big Men’ in Sierra Leone, Guinea and 
Liberia serve important roles of conflict resolution with security and development implications 
(Jörgel and Utas 2007).   
 
In fact, dispute resolution and the provision of local security and justice are the most common 
services provided by ILGIs in different parts of the world. Informal justice that is provided 
locally works because it is reflective of the cultural norms that exist within a community, is 
more readily understood by the parties involved as compared to formal justice, and is flexible 
enough to adapt to the changing local political and social context (Coburn 2013). It is true 
that such justice may often be imposed through violence, oppression and fear, such as by 
the ‘Big Men’ in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia (Jörgel and Utas 2007) or by khap 
panchayats in India (Ahlawat 2012). However, we found that for many rural populations, such 
as those in South Asia, they are the default option for multiple reasons: village-level informal 
councils of dispute resolution predate the relatively recent introduction of formal law in post-
colonial states; they are more accessible, familiar and relatively less complex when 
compared to formal laws and procedures; and rural citizens find the formal legal system to be 
intimidating and hard to understand, not least because they use official languages that are 
not always familiar to rural populations, such as English, Hindi or Urdu (Mohmand and Mejia 
Acosta 2012a).  
 
Similar informal justice systems are popular across Africa because of delays in the formal 
system, physical distances to formal courts, and the formal system’s incompatibility with how 
people actually understand justice as well as the unfamiliar complexity of the languages used 
and procedures followed in the courts (Penal Reform International 2001: 610). There are 
variations across these local justice systems  in the manner in which arbitrators are 
selected or elected and proceedings are carried out, their areas of jurisdiction, and the 
degree of independence from the state  but they share many commonalities, such as the 
power of tribal chiefs to compel disputing parties to attend hearings, consensual resolutions, 
oral record-keeping, the highly informal environment of proceedings and, perhaps most 
importantly, the fact that social pressure instead of physical coercion is used to enforce 
decisions (Chirayath, Sage and Woolcock 2005). Likewise, Baker (2005) and Isima (2007) 
argue that non-state policing in Sierra Leone is a result of the incapacity of the state police 
and that as the legitimacy of the state has come under question  a result of neoliberal 
policies in Africa  the legitimacy of parallel non-state security mechanisms has increased. 
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This school of thought, therefore, argues that the persistence of ILGIs is both a reflection of 
the weakness of formal state institutions and possibly also a lack of trust between states and 
more marginalised populations (Bratton 2007).  
 
4.3 Extending the writ of the state 
 
On the other side of the debate, and providing my third explanation, is literature arguing that 
ILGIs do not always substitute for a weak state. Very often they help expand the writ and 
authority of the state. Most of this literature talks of hybrid arrangements in which multiple 
state and non-state actors enter coalitions to produce everyday governance (Boege et al. 
2008; Hagmann 2013; Logan 2009; Meagher, Herdt and Titeca 2014). In our work too we 
found that, despite some unattractive features, ILGIs can constitute valuable instruments for 
governments, public bureaucracies and political parties whose local reach is limited, 
contested or unstable. ILGIs can help provide local political stability, channels through which 
government agencies can exercise authority and execute their programmes, and means for 
local political brokers to aggregate votes (Cheema et al. 2007, Mohmand 2011). For 
example, the field staff of government agencies charged with building schools, roads, wells 
or other minor infrastructure may depend on ILGIs to establish local consensus, acquire land, 
raise additional funds, or manage construction. Government agencies are continually 
tempted to try to use and work through ILGIs.  
 
This may apply in particular to conflict-affected contexts. In Timor-Leste, ILGIs ensure greater 
subscription to government programmes by providing information to the community on how 
to deal with unfamiliar procedures (Scheye 2009). In Colombia they provide ‘governance-
related advantages’ by supplementing the formal system in raising living standards of the 
most marginalised groups, and by bridging ‘the gap between “law in the books” and “law in 
action”’ the main reason why marginalised populations turn away from formal institutions 
and choose to work with ILGIs instead (Buscaglia and Stephan 2005: 90 and 1056). 
Similarly, ‘customary organisations’ in rural Afghanistan  ‘shuras (village councils), maliks 
(village executives), and mullahs (village lawgivers)’  not only maintain and manage 
communities’ access to water, land resources and credit by enforcing community rules and 
norms, but they also help maintain a degree of local order in a country that is otherwise 
characterised by national-level disorder, and can play a ‘potentially productive role… in the 
state-building process’ (Brick 2008).  
 
We have now a more nuanced level of explanation for the continuing importance of ILGIs in 
modern electoral democracies, including their role as political intermediaries; their ability to 
provide services and general governance when the state does not; and their ability to extend 
and complete the writ of post-colonial states.  
 
 
5 Variable and contested relationships between 
ILGIs and states 
 
My explanations for the persistence of ILGIs provided in the previous sections indicate that 
they stand in ambiguous, variable and contested relationships to the formal state apparatus. 
Debates around whether or not they should be delegated some formal functions generate 
major normative controversies that pit, at the extreme, somewhat romantic devotees of both 
localism and traditionalism against people who emphasise the role of ILGIs in perpetuating 
socioeconomic and sociocultural hierarchy, parochialism and gender subordination, 
sometimes coercively.   
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Their ambiguous and contested relationship with formal institutions is most vividly illustrated 
in connection with the one function that they most consistently perform: adjudicating local 
disputes and, if necessary, then enforcing their own rulings. We have examples from South 
India of High Court judges reacting to attempts by ILGIs  kattapanchayats in this case  to 
redistribute relief packages after the 2004 tsunami by calling them ‘illegal institutions’ that 
needed to be ‘dealt with an iron hand’ [sic] (The Hindu 2005, in Ananth Pur and Moore 2010). 
Virtually all the press coverage of ILGIs in India and Pakistan is sparked by instances of 
repression, stereotypically including murder, rape or other violence directed against 
individuals or families who transgress local inter-caste or inter-community boundaries. Yet 
the police regularly accept that ILGIs will deal with the great majority of local disputes, and on 
occasion even refer cases to them. Our research found that on average almost 75 per cent 
of rural citizens in the three regions of South Asia that we studied  Punjab in Pakistan, and 
Karnataka and Rajasthan in India  choose to use ILGIs to resolve disputes rather than the 
formal judicial system (Mohmand and Mejia Acosta 2012a). Villagers also sometimes engage 
in judicial forum shopping, taking cases from the ILGI to the formal courts when not satisfied 
with the original ruling.  
 
South Asian governments sporadically attempt either (a) to create quasi-formal local 
organisations that can provide the same cheap, quick and (generally) popular dispute 
resolution services as ILGIs;6 or (b) more radically, and generally in response to major crises 
of governability, actually to incorporate these into the formal governance apparatus. In 1993, 
the Government of India passed the PES Act, which formally recognises so-called ‘traditional 
tribal institutions’ as the lowest level of formal governance in areas populated largely by 
members of ‘Scheduled Tribes’. The implementation process has not been smooth, not least 
because the legislation discriminates against the significant proportion of people not 
registered as ‘tribal’ in these areas by excluding them from participation or representation in 
local government (Centre for the Future State 2010). 
 
We recorded instances of both approaches in the Western Balkans as well, where the 
attitude of the state has been similarly ambivalent towards the ILGIs, mesni zajednicas, over 
the last two decades. In the years immediately after the break-up of Yugoslavia, these 
institutions were generally ignored within the transitional political setup. Over time, they have 
been given greater responsibility and recognition and, in some cases, such as in one part of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,7 they now have a formal role in sub-municipal governance. But 
local governments share an uneasy relationship with these ILGIs, seeing them both as 
valuable partners in accessing communities and as political competitors that limit their scope. 
Meanwhile, donors have experimented with creating quasi-formal local organisations to 
improve citizen participation in local governance. Largely because these new structures 
worked in parallel to the already existing and deeply embedded mesni zajednicas, they were 
unable to play any significant additional role in involving citizens in local governance 
(Mohmand and Mejia Acosta 2012b).  
 
Similarly, since the Western armed forces assumed a major role in the governance of 
Afghanistan, there has been continuing debate about incorporating ‘traditional’ local 
institutions into formal governance structures in Afghanistan (Albrecht et al. 2011). This 
debate and the lack of significant progress on the idea reflects in part a fairly common 
                                                          
6  After Independence, the government of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh established in rural areas an alternative local 
justice system for minor issues and offences labelled the Nyaya Panchayat system. Cases were heard and adjudicated, 
in ‘traditional’ fashion, by a set of panchas (‘elders’), who in this case were indirectly elected from among themselves by 
members of elected local councils. When they studied this system in Bharatpur District of Uttar Pradesh in 1978, 
Meschievitz and Galanter found that it was generally popular. ‘The only opposition came from the local legal profession 
and the judicial officers in Bharatpur, all of whom (except the sub-district magistrate) wanted the NP abolished’ 
(Meschievitz and Galanter 1982: 57). However, these ‘alternative’ dispute resolution mechanisms have never thrived, 
and are sporadically re-established by governments responding to the perception that they are popular. 
7  Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into two political entities  the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the 
Republic Sprska. Mesni Zajednicas have more formal recognition in the Federation but not in the Republic. 
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tension in the relationship between ILGIs and states more generally: the limited capacity of 
states to reshape ILGIs in a purposive fashion, either to abolish them, reform them, or 
incorporate them into the formal apparatus of rule. I have already mentioned the apparent 
failure of recent efforts to recruit ‘traditional institutions’ into formal governance structures in 
Afghanistan and the tribal areas of India. We find a mirror image in the persistence of the 
local political dominance of another type of ILGI: propertied families in villages in Punjab 
Province, Pakistan. This dominance is rooted historically in major land resettlement 
operations in the late nineteenth century and the assignment to these families of large 
landholdings, political privileges and quasi-formal administrative roles formally termed 
‘unofficial agency’. In return they were required to cooperate in representing colonial 
authority locally and in otherwise enforcing local political order. Although their political 
privileges and formal administrative roles have been removed, and their landholdings much 
fragmented, members of these same families continue to exercise local political and electoral 
dominance. In a polity characterised by instability, intermittent military rule, political parties 
that lack continuous organisation and presence below the district level, and recurring efforts 
by the military to undermine those governments that have been popularly elected, few power 
holders have wished or been in a position seriously to establish formal local governance 
institutions that would eradicate the influence of these established intermediaries. Instead, 
the fact that they exercise a dominant role in determining rural politics has kept successive 
regimes and governments from coming down too strongly against them (Cheema et al. 2007; 
Mohmand 2011).  
 
Whether or not states can reshape ILGIs or, put differently, the extent to which ILGIs are 
altered by their interaction with the state, is an important debate in the literature. One 
perspective suggests that their incorporation into the formal system can create ambiguities 
about their roles and functions vis-à-vis local communities. Belgian colonial administration in 
Burundi reduced the local legitimacy of the informal institutions, the bashingantahe, by 
‘controlling their judgments, modifying their verdicts and withdrawing their right to impose 
certain sanctions’ (Dexter and Ntahombye 2005: 1420). Later political manipulations of their 
membership meant that communities became less and less trustful of their authority. Similar 
dynamics have been recorded in South Africa, Tanzania and Mozambique where several 
attempts have been made to incorporate customary institutions into the formal judiciary 
without much success (Chirayath et al. 2005 and Penal Reform International 2001: 4547). 
For example, in South Africa the legitimacy of informal street committees was challenged in 
the 1980s when the government set up community councils above them in an attempt to 
integrate them into the formal sphere. Street committee chairmen who cooperated with 
councillors were ‘given warnings’ by their constituents and some were even threatened or 
physically attacked. By 1985, most councillors had resigned. Similarly, traditional authorities 
in Mozambique lost legitimacy when they cooperated with the colonial state in policies 
involving forced labour and cultivation (Penal Reform International 2001: 4547). 
 
The other perspective within the debate argues that the engagement between states and 
ILGIs can positively alter the more repressive side of these institutions by putting pressure on 
chiefs ‘to “reinvent” themselves… as local-level “democrats” who are willing to adapt local 
institutions in the face of popular pressure for change’ (Williams 2004 in Logan 2009: 123). 
Such adaptations can include greater participation by marginalised groups, such as women 
and younger men, as well as the introduction of elections for the inzinduna, or local chiefs 
(Logan 2009: 123).  
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6 Conclusion: Thinking about variation 
 
I have drawn a boundary around the category of local institutions, ILGIs, that exercise 
general territorial authority within communities, and function across multiple domains. By 
looking at these in different contexts, I find that ILGIs shape citizen engagement with the 
state across a number of arenas and activities: 
 
 They organise vote banks within communities for parties, candidates and municipal 
governments, thereby affecting participation in elections. 
 They mediate disputes and dispense justice as substitutes to formal legal mechanisms. 
 They regulate citizens’ access to services (schools, health centres), and also regulate 
participation in community projects.  
 They mediate interactions with local governments, thereby affecting access to 
information, and participation in deliberative forums. 
 
They have three main defining characteristics: (a) they are state-like to the extent that they 
enjoy general local territorial authority, but without revenue prerogatives; (b) intermediation 
between local populations and the state constitutes a significant part of their activities; and 
(c) they stand in ambiguous, variable and contested relationships to the formal state 
apparatus. But how do we categorise and summarise variations within the ILGIs I have 
defined? Beneath the surface differences in forms, labels and local representations, what are 
the dominant criteria through which we should distinguish one type of ILGI from another?  
 
There are two major reasons why we can at present offer no more than a small part of the 
answer. The first is that we have little information on contemporary ILGIs; both social 
scientists and policymakers lack a systematic and nuanced understanding of their nature and 
impact on governance. The other is that the task of usefully typologising and categorising 
these ‘quasi-mini-states’ is in some respects as challenging as another, bigger project on 
which political science has long been engaged with limited success: typologising and 
categorising states ‘proper’. How far are they to be understood in terms of: (a) the internal 
configurations of socioeconomic interests that underpin them; (b) their external interactions 
with other, similar organisations; or (c) the interests and behaviour of those who control the 
core organisational structures? Fundamental questions of this nature about states are still 
unresolved. The prospects for resolution in relation to ILGIs are greater because they are 
much less complex organisations than states, but we are working with sparser information.  
 
Virtually all political institutions simultaneously exhibit two different faces. On the one hand, 
they are instruments of domination, through which those people and agencies that enjoy 
power advantage themselves over others, and strive to maintain their dominance. On the 
other hand, they are frameworks within which some people use power to coordinate a range 
of other actors to achieve collective goals and provide public goods (Moe 2005). But the 
mixture varies widely from case to case. ILGIs are no exception. Often it is their exploitative 
face that attracts the attention of external observers. Yet, in many cases, their collective 
provisioning roles are also strikingly evident. The variety of cases discussed in this paper 
suggest that we should eschew simple assumptions about how ‘traditional’ institutions impact 
on local governance, and spend more time exploring variations and looking for recent 
modifications, especially modifications induced by changes in their immediate political and 
administrative environments. I hope this paper serves both to stimulate additional research 
and suggest how that research might usefully be framed.  
 
Possibly the most important single conceptual distinction we have to make is between 
personalistic and collegiate institutions, that is, those where authority is vested in individuals 
and those where it is shared among more or less equal colleagues. This distinction is 
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relative. While most ILGIs in the Pakistani Punjab are clearly personalistic, others combine 
elements of both. For example, ILGIs in Karnataka are collegiate to the extent that they 
explicitly represent a range of individual caste groups and other local interests, and the norm 
of consensus strongly influences their proceedings. However, they remain personalistic to 
the extent that individual males from particular families have, in varying degrees, recognised 
claims to be representatives and to play leading roles in directing the council itself. Mesni 
zajednicas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, have elected presidents and 
council members who are voted in by the community for a fixed term and are relatively less 
able to draw on social and familial attributes for their power. 
 
How might a better understanding of ILGIs matter for policy purposes? The answer will vary 
greatly according to context and the type of ILGI under question. In places like the Pakistani 
Punjab, the primary need is for reforms to weaken the powers of the more personalistic ILGIs 
and those that implement harsh versions of ‘traditional’ local social mores. Landlords should 
not be able to bargain away a thousand votes in a parliamentary election for the promise of 
resurfacing a kilometre of village road. Village elders should not be able to punish a man for 
a sexual transgression with a woman of a higher caste by ordering the rape of his sister. In 
other places, knotty public policy problems arise from recent efforts by governments to 
recognise ‘traditional local institutions’ and ‘recruit’ them, in unrealistic ways, into the formal 
state apparatus. In some of the Pushtun areas of Afghanistan, provincial governors have 
tried unsuccessfully to bring under their own authority the local ‘militias’ that serve as the 
implementing arms of representative autonomous local councils (Usman 2007). In yet others, 
such as those parts of India that are ‘scheduled’ as having majority tribal populations, the 
issue is one of including in formal governance local institutions that may be very ill suited to 
assume the responsibilities that they are being asked to bear because they have little 
general local territorial authority, and are accepted as legitimate only in respect of the 
regulation of marriage, disputes and interpersonal interaction among the members of specific 
tribes. The initiative to recruit them into the formal structures of local government in states 
like Jharkhand is generating a great deal of resistance and conflict (Majeed 2007). 
 
The contrasts between the various cases I have examined or mentioned above – notably 
Karnataka on the one hand and the Pakistani Punjab, Pushtun Afghanistan and Jharkhand 
on the other – suggest a rather striking hypothesis about the acceptability of ILGIs as 
providers of local governance that might help stimulate and frame further research. The 
hypothesis is that, the more similar ILGIs are in form and function to their ‘traditional’ 
manifestations, the less likely it is that they will meet the standards of competence, legitimacy 
and representativeness that would make them acceptable as components of contemporary 
local governance systems. Conversely, the more they have interacted with formal political 
and administrative institutions in a pluralist, competitive environment, the more they are likely 
to merit acceptance and recognition. The extent to which this hypothesis can be generalised 
needs to be tested across different contexts, and suggests an interesting area for future 
research.  
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